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The Story of San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local 
Control, and Constitutional Limits 
 
 
Michael Heise 
 
 
 
 The story of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez1 is comprised of 
many different stories deriving from many different perspectives.  For Demetrio 
Rodriguez (and the other plaintiffs), the Rodriguez decision meant that the federal courts 
were not going to assist in a drive to secure greater school resources and increase equity 
among school districts in Texas.  For the state of Texas (and, indeed, almost every other 
state), the decision prevented a dismantling of the basic architecture of the state’s school 
finance system which relies heavily on local property taxes.  As a consequence, per pupil 
spending in most states, including Texas, remains acutely sensitive to variations in local 
property tax receipts.   For school finance reformers, the 5-4 defeat in Rodriguez 
precluded a single federal resolution to persisting school finance fights.  To be sure, the 
Rodriguez decision did not end the school finance debate in Texas or elsewhere.  Instead, 
the decision redirected reformers and their legal claims to state courts and constitutions 
across the country.  For constitutionalists, the Rodriguez decision made clear (once again) 
that education is not a fundamental right, wealth is not a suspect classification, and the 
Constitution’s reach has limits.  So long as rationality tethers a state’s school finance 
system to a legitimate end, Rodriguez insulates states from federal courts.  Finally, for 
institutionalists, the Rodriguez litigation forced the Court to confront judicial capacity 
issues anew.  Already humbled by the challenges incident to the federal courts’ effort to 
dismantle de jure and de facto school segregation, the Rodriguez decision evidences 
reluctance by some of the Justices to become ensnarled in an effort to dismantle school 
finance systems in way that would affect an overwhelming majority of the nation’s public 
schools.  By side-stepping such a confrontation, Rodriguez implicitly reveals important 
aspects about the federal courts and, in particular, how the Justices view their role in our 
federal system and the Court’s ability as an institution to achieve sought-after policy 
goals.  These various stories and perspectives, separately and collectively, enrichen, fuel, 
and complicate Rodriguez’s enduring and evolving legacy. 
 
 This Chapter seeks to convey the richness of the many stories and perspectives 
that collectively comprise Rodriguez.  I first describe the major parties as well as the 
initial lawsuit in federal district court.  I then turn to the judicial opinions generated by 
the district court and U.S. Supreme Court.  A comparison of the two opinions reveals 
decidedly different approaches to such issues as judicial capacity, fundamental rights, and 
federalism.  I also consider the opinions’ practical consequences and place them into the 
broader legal context, especially with respect to the concurrent school desegregation 
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litigation.  I conclude with a brief review of the school finance setting in Texas today, 
including in the Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts, which illustrates that while 
Rodriguez may have answered some questions, it raised others and deflected school 
finance battles from the federal government to state governments. 
 
Demetrio Rodriguez and the Edgewood School District 
 
Demetrio Rodriguez, then six years old, moved in 1931 with his migrant farming 
family from a small Texas farming town near the Rio Grande to San Antonio in search of 
better public schools.  In 1957, Demetrio, by then a U.S. Navy and Air Force veteran as 
well as a husband and father, moved his family to the Edgewood area, a “sprawling 
Hispanic barrio” on San Antonio’s southwest side and close to an air force base where 
Demetrio worked as a sheet-metal welder.2 
 
In 1968, public schools in the San Antonio area varied tremendously in numerous 
ways.  The Edgewood school district, one of seven in the San Antonio area, enrolled 
approximately 22,000 students in its twenty-five elementary and secondary schools.3  
Edgewood schools served predominately minority children (over 90 percent Hispanic and 
6 percent African-American) from low-income households ($4,686 median family 
income).4  The schooling situation was quite different in the nearby Alamo Heights 
school district, San Antonio’s most affluent school district.  Alamo Heights schools 
served students from wealthier households (median family income exceeded $8,000) 
which were far more likely to be white (only 18 percent Hispanic and less than 1 percent 
African-American).5 
 
Beyond potentially dry Census data on the two school districts, the Edgewood and 
Alamo Heights differed in other important ways.  For example, parental education levels 
varied dramatically between the two districts.  While in Alamo Heights 75 percent of the 
residents completed high school, fewer than one in ten of the Edgewood residents earned 
high school diplomas.6  These stark differences in education attainment levels correlated 
with other predictable differences, including employment outcomes.  The Alamo Heights 
district teemed with lawyers, doctors, and bankers—professionals with college (and 
beyond) training.  In 1970, for example, more than 50 percent of male workers in Alamo 
Heights held executive or professional titles.  In Edgewood, however, only four percent 
of the males enjoyed similar success in the workforce.7 
 
 Although only a few miles separate the Alamo Heights and Edgewood school 
districts, from an educational perspective the two districts could not have been farther 
apart.  Although it is seductively easy to become lost in the highly technical, arcane, and 
formulaic world of school finance, what typically lurks behind most discussions of mill 
levys, equalized tax rates, and assessed valuations is one profoundly simple yet forceful 
observation—education resources distribute unevenly across districts within a state.  In 
1968, the distribution of school resources in Texas followed a pattern typical for that era.  
Per pupil spending in Edgewood, an overwhelmingly poor and minority school district, 
was $356,8 while per pupil spending in the predominately white and affluent neighboring 
Alamo Heights district was $594,9 or two-thirds more.  Although a per pupil spending 
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difference of $238 does not sound like much by today’s school spending standards, in 
today’s (2006) dollars the difference amounts to $1,435 per pupil.10 
 
Making matters worse was that the per pupil spending disparity arose even though 
Edgewood residents taxed themselves at a rate higher than the Alamo Heights residents.11  
To completely off-set the stark difference in property values between Edgewood and 
Alamo Heights and generate equal per pupil spending, the tax rate in Edgewood would 
have to have been be twenty times greater than the Alamo Heights tax rate.12  Adding 
further insult to injury was a Texas law that imposed a property tax ceiling which in 
effect precluded equal per pupil spending in Edgewood and Alamo Heights.  Demetrio 
Rodriguez and other parents in the Edgewood school district confronted a vexing 
dilemma.  Texas school finance law, specifically its reliance on local property tax 
revenues, generated considerable differences in per pupil spending and Texas tax law 
prevented equalization.  Recognition of this dilemma, however, did little to ameliorate 
conditions in Demetrio Rodriguez’s children’s dilapidated Edgewood schools. 
 
The Complaint 
 
About the same time Demetrio Rodriguz and other parents began focusing on 
school funding disparities with an eye toward possible litigation, two developments 
emerged.  First, parents and activists in California were focusing in a similar—though 
distinct—way.  One distinction in particular is critical.  In their complaint in the Serrano 
litigation, the plaintiffs in California alleged state (as well as federal) constitutional 
violations in state court,13 claims that ultimately prevailed in the California Supreme 
Court.14  Second, emerging academic research (part of which stimulated and shaped the 
Serrano litigation in California) began to sketch the contours of a federal legal challenge 
to state school finance systems. 
 
Frustrated with Texas lawmakers’ disinterest in equalizing school spending, 
dispirited by their under-resourced schools, and buoyed by similar (though distinct) 
litigation in California, Rodriguez and other parents sought redress in the courts.  Unlike 
their counterparts in California, however, Rodriguez turned to the federal constitution and 
federal courts.  In 1968, with his children attending Edgewood schools, the forty-two 
year-old Demetrio (along with six other parents) filed a class action lawsuit in federal 
district court that fundamentally challenged the way Texas funded its public schools. 
 
The complaint filed in Rodriguez is important for the arguments and theories it 
advanced as well as for those it did not.  The lead attorney, Arthur Gochman, developed 
two principal claims.  First, he asserted that low-income households, clustered in low-
spending school districts like Edgewood, constituted a suspect class, thereby triggering 
strict judicial scrutiny of Texas’ school finance system.  Second, he argued that education 
was a fundamental right and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas was obligated to 
provide it on an equal basis.  Gouchman asserted that the per pupil spending disparities 
between Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts, as well as similar disparities between 
and among other school districts across Texas, evidenced unconstitutionally unequal 
treatment. 
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Gochman’s focus on poverty as a suspect classification warranting strict judicial 
scrutiny was not without legal precedent, albeit tangential to and non-binding in the 
education context.  In Griffin v. Illinois,15 the United States Supreme Court struck down 
state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from access to a trial transcript.  
The state fee requirements were held to discriminate against low-income defendants who 
were otherwise financially unable to access trail transcripts.  Similarly, in Douglas v. 
California,16 the Court established an indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed (and 
funded) counsel for those defendants with no other way to gain access to an attorney.  
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter,17 the Court invalidated a Texas filing-fee requirement for 
candidates seeking to compete in primary elections.  Under the fee system, potential 
candidates without the financial ability to pay the filing fee were unable to compete for 
public office.  The litigants in Rodriguez set out to leverage the comparative poverty in 
the Edgewood district and extend suspect class status—recognized by the Court in non-
education contexts—to include the school setting. 
 
 Although direct legal support for Gochman’s argument that the per pupil spending 
gap between Edgewood and Alamo Heights students violated the federal Equal 
Protection clause was lacking, potentially analogous case law existed.  One decision, 
Hobson v. Hanson18 involved per pupil spending variations within a single district—the 
District of Columbia public schools.  Gochman sought to extend Hobson’s logic to 
variation across districts within Texas.  As well, the now-substantial intellectual and 
scholarly attention to school finance today19 was only emerging at the time Gochman 
crafted the Rodriguez complaint and, as a consequence, Gochman had comparatively 
fewer scholarly assets to leverage.20 
 
Interestingly (especially so in the shadow of the concurrent school desegregation 
litigation), the Rodriguez complaint did not pursue racial (or ethnic) discrimination 
theories.  Indeed, Gochman assiduously avoided casting the Rodriguez case as a “race” 
case.  He ignored the racial and ethnic dimensions even though the Edgewood district 
was overwhelmingly Hispanic and the Alamo Heights district predominately white.  
Nevertheless, Rodriguez was consciously framed as a finance case and the attorneys in 
Rodriguez emphasized the Edgewood district’s poverty rather than the district’s 
overwhelmingly non-white citizenry. 
 
What might explain the strategic decision to cast Rodriguez in financial rather 
than racial or ethnic terms?  After all, racial discrimination was the dominant theme of 
the quickly maturing school desegregation jurisprudence.  The absence of perfect 
correlation between ethnicity and geography might have deterred Gochman.  (If so, his 
intuition was vindicated by the Court’s reliance on a study by Professor Burke 
documenting something less than a perfect correlation between a school district’s 
percentage of minority students and per pupil spending levels.21)  Although Edgewood 
was overwhelmingly Hispanic, it was not exclusively so.  Similarly, while Alamo Heights 
was predominately white, some—albeit few—residents were either Hispanic or non-
white.  Another possibility is that the predominately Hispanic Edgewood residents were 
simply more interested in increasing resources for their schools rather than increasing 
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racial and ethnic integration levels.  Regardless of the reason, it is difficult to overstate 
the strategic importance of the decision to frame Rodriguez in terms of poverty and 
education rather than in terms of race and ethnicity.22 
 
By the time the district court decided the Rodriguez case the relevant legal terrain 
had evolved in important ways as the school finance litigation movement had begun in 
earnest.  In Serrano v. Priest,23 the California Supreme Court concluded that within state 
per pupil spending variations violated the Fourteenth Amendment as well as state law.  In 
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,24 the court reached a similar conclusion and made the more 
subtle point that the wealth variations (specifically, the per pupil spending differences) 
were created by state policy.  Although unavailable at the time Gochman crafted the legal 
complaint, the district court opinion in Rodriguez made good use of these new cases. 
 
District Court Decision 
 
 Although the district court heard arguments in the Rodriguez case in 1968, its 
opinion was not issued until late 1971, more than three years after the lawsuit was filed.  
Because the case challenged state (Texas) law on federal grounds (Fourteenth 
Amendment), the case was argued to a three-judge district court panel.25  The district 
court panel initially wrestled with the standard of review question.  The state of Texas 
urged the court to apply the less onerous rational basis test, while the plaintiffs urged 
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of judicial review.  The district court concluded 
that because the Texas school finance system was based upon wealth—a suspect 
classification—and, in addition, implicated a fundamental interest—education—strict 
judicial scrutiny was warranted.26  To survive strict judicial scrutiny, the court noted that 
Texas must demonstrate that a compelling governmental interest supporting its use of a 
property tax-based school finance regime that generated uneven per pupil spending 
among districts across the state. 
 
 Texas’ central argument, that its property tax-based school funding system 
enhanced local control and autonomy by giving local taxpayers a significant voice in 
deciding how much to spend on their local public schools,27 did not persuade the district 
court.  Instead, the district court felt that Texas’ school finance system, combined with 
state property tax caps, had the effect of reducing local district autonomy,28 thereby 
turning Texas’ critical argument on its head.  Because “Texas discriminates on the basis 
of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent districts to provide a higher quality education 
for their children, while paying lower taxes,” the district court concluded the plaintiffs 
had been denied equal protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.29 
 
In addition to concluding that Texas failed to articulate and support a compelling 
governmental interest, the court went on to reach the far more provocative conclusion 
that Texas’ school finance plan failed the far less onerous rational relation test.  The 
federal district court felt that the purported relation between Texas’ property tax-based 
school finance system was not rationally related to any legitimate governmental end such 
as local autonomy or control over local school spending.30 
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Setting aside formal legal reasoning, the palpable differences between the 
Edgewood and Alamo Heights schools likely were not lost on the three-judge panel 
hearing the case.  One of the three, Judge Spears, appointed to the federal bench by 
President Kennedy, lived in Alamo Heights.  According to one commentator, “[Judge] 
Spears knew very well the disparities between schools in Edgewood and Alamo 
Heights.”31 
 
 Two key themes emerge from the district court opinion that continue to resonate 
throughout many aspects of education law in general and school finance litigation in 
particular.  First, the court opinion implicitly equated “higher quality education” with 
higher per pupil spending.  Second, the opinion conveyed some trepidation owing to 
separation of powers concerns. 
 
School Spending and Quality 
 
Embedded within the plaintiffs’ complaint and the district court opinion is the 
assumption that the quality of education offered in Alamo Heights is superior to the 
education offered in Edgewood and that this quality difference is a function of per pupil 
spending.  Such an assumption risks conflating education quality (and related reform 
efforts designed to enhance and more broadly distribute quality), school spending, and 
student academic achievement.32  By accepting such an assumption, the court presumed 
causal simplicity and clarity where reality is anything but simple and clear.  If anything, 
debates over whether money “matters,” especially as it relates to student academic 
achievement, are noted for their technical complexities and endurance.33  Explanations 
for and theories on why some students perform well and others perform poorly are 
endlessly debated in the literature.34 
 
Two major studies, both by Professor Coleman,35 sparked public and academic 
debates about the relation between school spending and student achievement.  In 1966, 
Coleman (and colleagues) released a large and controversial report on the nation’s 
schools, which emphasized the influence of family and the socioeconomic status of a 
student’s classmates on academic achievement.36  The study found that, from the 
perspective of influencing student academic achievement, school spending mattered very 
little and that a student’s socioeconomic status mattered a great deal.37  Although the 
question about the relation between school spending and student academic achievement 
remains hotly contested,38 the assertion that students’ socioeconomic status matters a 
great deal has withstood the test of time.39  Numerous subsequent studies find that “the 
social composition of the student body is more highly related to achievement, 
independent of the student’s own social background, than is any other school factor.”40 
Notably, education commentators of every political stripe acknowledge the robustness 
and consistency of these findings.41  Simply put, “[i]f there is one thing that is more 
related to a child’s academic achievement than coming from a poor household, it is going 
to school with children from other poor households.”42 
 
In addition to exploring the larger question of whether money “matters” in terms 
of student achievement, scholars have compared results from schools that spend different 
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amounts on similar types of students.  Again, research by Professor Coleman resides at 
the heart of this ongoing debate.43  Professor Coleman (and colleagues) published the first 
major quantitative study exploring differences in student achievement between public and 
private (principally Catholic) schools and found that students in private schools 
performed slightly better, after controlling for student race and socioeconomic 
background.44  What makes the comparison especially important for the school finance 
debate in general and the Rodriguez case in particular is that many of the higher 
performing inner-city private schools spent less on a per pupil basis than their public 
school counterparts.45 
 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Remedies 
 
A second important theme developed in the district court opinion involves the 
court’s sensitivity to separation of powers concerns.  Mindful that it is not a “super-
legislature,”46 the district court’s order evidenced some degree of tentativeness when it 
ordered relief that was prospective and became effective only if, after two years, the 
Texas Legislature did not modify the school finance system in a manner that addressed 
the court’s concerns.47 
 
What to make of the prospective relief awarded by the district court?  Some view 
it as an abdication of the court’s responsibility.48  After all, from a remedies’ perspective 
the court effectively turned to the very institution that created the unconstitutional school 
finance system in the first place—the Texas General Assembly—for a resolution.  Some 
wondered whether the court’s approach to the remedy reflected a misapprehension of the 
lessons learned in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)49 and from the “with all 
deliberate speed” experiment.50  After all, one decade after Brown II, the Supreme Court 
itself remarked that the implementation of the desegregation remedy resulted in "entirely 
too much deliberation and not enough speed."51 
 
The district court’s prospective relief may also have reflected a necessary (if 
regrettable) judicial bow to reality.  First, if the federal courts learned anything from the 
debate surrounding the “all deliberate speed” remedy articulated in Brown II they learned 
something about judicial capacity.  In the school finance context, empirical evidence on 
the ability of court decisions to influence education spending is mixed, at best, and some 
suggest that courts in some states may have overestimated their comparative institutional 
strength.52  Second, with something as technically complex as school finance, 
institutional capacity and comparative expertise suggest some role for state lawmakers 
and policymakers in fashioning a remedy. 
 
Third, it is likely that political context cannot be ignored without peril.  Indeed, 
Professor Gewirtz,53 among others, argues that “remedies must take account of resistance 
from the world they hope to transform and that in some cases courts may properly make 
compromises and limit remedies because of this resistance.”54  Many governors and state 
lawmakers do not appreciate the perceived (or real) “end-run” around the legislative 
process to the courthouse in an effort to garner increased educational resources.  
Resistance to judicially-mandated or initiated school finance reform, both formal and 
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informal, hinders many successful lawsuits that rely on legislators and governors for 
implementation at the remedial stage.  Of course, such an argument risks collapsing into 
tautology.  After all, one reason why successful school finance lawsuits, such as 
Rodriguez, may not generate the sought-after increased per pupil spending equity is 
precisely because courts may be reluctant to vigorously impose judicial sanctions owing 
to either real or theoretical separation of powers concerns. 
 
The benefit of a two-year window to generate a legislative fix to the school 
finance problems the district court identified did not placate Texas lawmakers.  Given the 
novel legal theories pushed in the Rodriguez complaint, Texas lawmakers were publicly 
(and privately) confident that the district court would see the situation their way and 
would not disrupt the Texas school finance system.  Clearly, officials in Texas were 
caught off guard by the district court’s decision.55  Not surprisingly, the defendants 
swiftly decided to appeal the ruling.  Because of the case’s unusual procedural posture, a 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court was possible and, indeed, successfully pursued by the 
defendants.   
 
Supreme Court Opinion 
 
The various parts of the Supreme Court’s Rodriguez opinion consume 137 pages 
in the U. S. Reports and include concurring and dissenting opinions.  Justice Powell, a 
Nixon appointee (and former Chair of the Richmond (Virginia) School Board),56 
structured the opinion around three central tasks.  First, the opinion distinguished the 
class of low-income members challenging Texas’ school finance system from other low-
income individuals who successfully established poverty as a suspect class in other 
cases.57  Second, once establishing that the Edgewood schoolchildren did not constitute a 
suspect class,58 the Court concluded that public education was not a fundamental right 
under the U.S. Constitution.59  Third, without the benefit of a suspect class or a 
fundamental right, the Court left Rodriguez with only the argument that the Texas school 
finance system did not rationally relate to various state interests, including local control.  
The Court concluded that Texas’ school finance system was not irrationally related to 
such legitimate governmental ends (such as local control), reversed the district court’s 
holding, and upheld Texas’ school finance system. 
 
 The Court’s decision had two immediate practical consequences for Demetrio 
Rodriguez in particular and the then-nascent school finance movement more generally.  
First, the opinion contributed significant momentum to the proposition that education was 
not a fundamental right under the federal constitution.  During the second half of the 
twentieth century the Supreme Court had at least two separate and prime opportunities to 
deem education as a fundamental constitutional right.  On both occasions, in Brown v. 
Board of Education (Brown I)60 and Rodriguez, the Court declined to make such a 
finding.  In Rodriguez, the Court hinted at the hypothetical possibility of some federal 
constitutional right to education when it noted: “Even if it were conceded that some 
quantifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of 
educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.”61  While 
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entertaining the possibility that the federal constitution might substantively require that 
Texas provide some level of education, the Court assiduously declined to articulate the 
federal threshold, save to remark that Texas already exceeded it.62 
 
 A second immediate consequence of the Rodriguez decision was to fundamentally 
redirect the school finance litigation movement.  Although the decision shut the federal 
door on school finance litigation in federal court, the Rodriguez opinion did not end the 
school finance litigation movement.  Instead, the decision redirected the litigation to state 
courts and state constitutions.  Despite this abrupt change in fora as well as the source of 
a potential right, the school finance litigation movement survived the Rodriguez decision.  
Indeed, school finance activists did not have to wait long for success in the state courts.  
Just thirteen days following the Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
declared that its school finance system violated the New Jersey Constitution’s promise 
for a “thorough and efficient education.”63 
 
The Dissents 
 
 Even if the Rodriguez was not a 5-4 decision, the dissenting opinions warrant 
careful consideration.  The dissenting Justices pursued two main points.  Justice White’s 
dissent conceded rational relation as the appropriate standard for judicial review but 
(echoing the district court opinion) argued that the Texas school finance system 
nonetheless failed to meet the “rational” threshold.  Justice Marshall’s dissent, in 
contrast, argued that because education was a fundamental right the Texas school finance 
system warranted strict judicial scrutiny which, Marshall argued, it failed to survive. 
  
 Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, began his dissent by 
conceding the critical role played by local control and decision making in our democratic 
system of government.  Nevertheless, Justice White went on to point out that to satisfy 
the rational relation test, the Texas school finance system must satisfy two elements.  
First, it must pursue a valid, rational, legislative end (enhancing local control).  Second, 
the “means chosen by the State must also be rationally related to the end sought to be 
achieved.”64   
 
Justice White’s dissent dwelled on the second element and construed the 
magnitude of the per pupil spending difference between the Edgewood and Alamo 
Heights districts as evidence that Texas’ reliance on property-based tax revenues 
paradoxically undermined the state’s articulated goal of enhancing local control.  This 
paradox emerged because disparities in property valuations interacted with local taxing 
power incident to the Texas school funding system in a way that made it “impossible” for 
Edgewood residents to generate “comparable school revenues.”65  And this impossibility, 
according to Justice White, makes Texas’ school finance system constitutionally 
irrational because it turned Texas’ purported rational for its desired legislative end—a 
school finance system that enhanced local control—on its head. 
 
 In contrast to Justice White, Justice Marshall continued to argue that education 
was a fundamental right.  Justice Marshall’s prior inability to persuade the Court to 
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declare education as a fundamental right in Brown (as an advocate for the plaintiffs) did 
not deter him from revisiting the issue now that he sat on the Court.  After categorizing 
Court pronouncements of education’s importance, Justice Marshall developed the 
argument that education “directly affects” a child’s ability to enjoy other core rights 
clearly articulated by the Constitution and deemed fundamental by the Court, such as 
speech.66  Justice Marshall argued that the nexus between education and the engagement 
in the political process was sufficiently robust that, according to Marshall, the former was 
fundamental as a matter of constitutional law and, as such, triggered strict judicial 
scrutiny of Texas’ school finance system.  Recognizing that some students in property-
poor schools academically out performed their counterparts attending property-rich 
schools67 helped prompt Marshall to shift his analytic focus of the Equal Protection 
Clause from student achievement (outputs) to education inputs (per pupil spending and 
taxing efforts).68 
 
Fundamental Rights and Limiting Principles 
 
 In Brown, although the Court famously noted education’s importance to citizens 
and society,69 the Court declined to construe education as a fundamental right.  The 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez invited the Court to re-think the issue.  Although the Court again 
concluded that education was important,70 it affirmatively and unambiguously declined to 
construe the right to education as fundamental.71  Indeed, one decade later in Plyler v. 
Doe,72 the Court reiterated this theme when it once again acknowledged that education, 
while not constitutionally fundamental, nonetheless occupied a “fundamental role in 
maintaining the fabric of our society.”73 
 
 Why has the Court for more than one-half century self-consciously declined to 
construe education as a fundamental right under the federal constitution?   Or, more to the 
point, why did the Court in Rodriguez decline to extend the logic in Brown and deem 
education a fundamental right?  For plaintiffs like Demetrio Rodriguez and, more 
importantly, his (and other) children attending Edgewood schools, the stakes were, of 
course, enormous.  Were the Court to deem education fundamental, encroachments 
against education rights would trigger strict judicial scrutiny. 
 
Ironically, some of the leading reasons offered to support education’s status as a 
fundamental right help explain the Court’s reluctance to embrace the argument.  In 
Rodriguez, for example, the petitioners argued that education deserved elevated 
constitutional stature partly because of its nexus with other Court-recognized 
fundamental rights, notably those involving speech and voting.74  Such an argument is 
not without legal foundation.  Prior to Rodriguez, the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections75 determined that a citizen’s right to vote was fundamental because it is 
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights,”76 such as political expression.77 
 
From the Court’s perspective in Rodriguez, however, such an argument proved 
too much and logically took the Court into uncomfortable terrain.  The Court noted that 
such an argument lacked a limiting principle that would enable the Justices to clearly 
demark a boundary separating fundamental from non-fundamental interests.  The Court 
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wondered how one might distinguish education from hunger, clothing, or shelter in 
relation to the First Amendment or rights to meaningful political participation.  And if a 
logically coherent line could not distinguish education from other such interests, the 
result would conflict with existing Court precedent (unchallenged by Rodriguez).78 
 
That said, the Rodriguez Court conceded some analytic ground, if only 
rhetorically.  Specifically, the Court held open the possibility that “some identifiable 
quantum of education” may, in fact, be fundamental as it might be required to protect 
other constitutional rights.79  Having raised the theoretical specter of education as a 
fundamental right, the Court then quickly dismissed the issue’s relevance in Rodriguez by 
noting that whatever amount of education is required by the federal constitution, Texas 
met that minimal burden.  Thus, the Court hinted at the conceptual possibility of a 
fundamental right in education without meaningfully defining that threshold, aside from a 
nod to Texas’ efforts.80 
 
The Persistently Uneasy Relations Among Race, Resources, and Student Achievement 
in School Reform Litigation 
 
An important vein in the debate about the relation between school spending and 
educational opportunity involves the equally complex relation between school spending 
and race.  The arguments advanced in Rodriguez, when combined with many arguments 
advanced in numerous school desegregation cases of that era, uncover a critical struggle 
to coherently synthesize the influences of race and resources on student academic 
achievement.  The juxtaposition between the standard school desegregation case, moored 
in racial equality, and the nascent school finance cases, principally pivoting on economic 
disparity, could not have been more stark to the Justices on October 12, 1972, as on that 
day, both the Rodriguez and Keyes v. School District No. 181 cases were argued. 
 
In Keyes, the Court confronted the first major test of the de jure/de facto 
desegregation distinction.  Two years earlier, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board 
of Education,82 the Court articulated a rebuttable presumption of segregative intent where 
schools were “substantially disproportionate in their racial composition.”83  In Swann, the 
Court imputed the racially isolated schools to the district’s prior de jure segregation 
policies.  In Keyes, in contrast, Denver’s school district never operated de jure school 
segregation policies.  Nevertheless, due to complex interactions among such variables as 
population shifts, school district student assignment policies, and demographic trends, 
racially identifiable (and thus, under Keyes, presumptively unconstitutional) schools 
emerged.  Embedded within school desegregation litigation efforts that sought to 
redistribute students within a district owing to race was an implicit assumption about 
disparities in school quality. 
 
While Keyes understood equal educational opportunity (and thus, to some degree, 
school quality) in terms of race, Rodriguez, in contrast, eschewed that approach and 
instead operationalized educational opportunity in terms of school resources independent 
of race.  Having embarked upon an argument that the low-income families in Edgewood 
were denied equal educational opportunity, the Rodriguez litigants claimed that, because 
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of Texas’ school finance system the Edgewood district was consigned to an inferior 
education (as compared to families in high-income districts).  Although educational 
quality was operationalized largely in terms of traditional inputs—teacher turnover rates, 
teacher quality and experience, and school facilities—such outputs as student 
achievement and high school completion rates were also folded into the argument.84   
 
Judicial remedies isolated problems flowing from competing conceptions of equal 
educational opportunity promoted in school desegregation and finance cases.  As 
Professor Liu observes,85 while both Keyes and Rodriguez pushed the equal educational 
opportunity doctrine, the two cases differed in a critical assumption incident to the 
requested remedies.86  The Keyes litigation embodied an assumption that increased 
educational resources—absent integration—were ineffectual.  The Rodriquez litigation, 
by contrast, implicitly assumed that increased educational resources were necessary to 
enhance equal educational opportunity even in intensely racially isolated schools.  Unlike 
the district court’s embrace of the asserted relation between school spending and 
quality,87 the Supreme Court’s opinion conveyed discomfort with even entertaining what 
it characterized as a controversial assertion.88  No doubt owing to the complexity and 
uncertainty surrounding these issues, courts since Rodriguez remain split over their 
understanding of the relation between school funding and student achievement.89  
Perhaps even more startling is the confidence expressed by some courts in reaching a 
firm conclusion on this issue, especially in light of the acknowledged uncertainty within 
the social science community.90 
 
Race, Resources, Rodriguez, and Hindsight 
 
 Although the evolution of the equal educational opportunity doctrine includes a 
transition from a focus on race to a focus on resources and thereby cements a link 
between race and resources,91 the plaintiffs in Rodriguez took great pains to frame their 
lawsuit in terms of wealth disparity rather than race.  This strategic decision was pursued 
despite palpable racial and ethnic dimensions that separate the Edgewood and Alamo 
Heights districts.  Whatever the strategy’s merits were in the late 1960s, conventional 
litigation wisdom today is to conflate—and not separate—school finance and race and 
ethnicity.92 
 
 Efforts to separate wealth from race and ethnicity in the school context risk 
running against intellectual currents propelled by the Brown decision.  While litigation 
aimed at eliminating school segregation on the basis of race descend directly from 
Brown, leading school finance litigants argue that school finance litigation resides within 
a “progressive legal dynamic” created by the Brown decision.93  Moreover, school 
finance and desegregation litigation persist as integral parts of a larger project seeking 
enhanced educational opportunity.94 
 
 Even if it made sense to divorce wealth from race and ethnicity in the school 
context during the late 1960s, as evidenced by Rodriguez’s framing, from a practical 
standpoint it makes less strategic sense today.  Indeed, the two litigation efforts 
complement each other.  As Professor Ryan notes,95 it is easy to contemplate how school 
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desegregation and finance litigation efforts could have coalesced in a way beneficial to 
poor and minority students by “ensuring that the fate of disadvantaged students was tied 
to the fate of their more advantaged peers.”96  In addition, the prospect for school finance 
reform is far higher where its beneficiaries are not of one race, and desegregation is more 
palatable to more where all schools are already amply resourced.97  To some, then, the 
Sheff v. O’Neill98 litigation in Connecticut, which conspicuously conflated race and 
school finance, addressed a task side-stepped by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez: 
synthesizing school finance and desegregation theory in a manner that advances a broader 
understanding of equal educational opportunity.99 
 
The Lure of Local Control 
 
Presaging one key rationale supporting the outcome in Milliken v. Bradley,100 
decided one year later, the Rodriguez opinion placed great analytic weight on the notion 
of local control and articulated fidelity to principles of federalism and separation of 
powers.  The Court’s comfort with local control in the education setting has increased 
over time.  In Rodriguez, the Court concluded that local control was important and that 
Texas’s reliance on local property taxes was not irrational.  One year later (1974) in 
Milliken the Court more forcefully defended local control and declared: “No single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation 
of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of 
community concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational 
process.”101  Indeed, the Milliken opinion cites to Rodriguez for support for the 
proposition that local control over education policy fuels citizen participation and 
education quality.102 
 
A fidelity to local control over education policy continues to occupy an exalted 
place in American lore and exert significant sway over many citizens.103  Moreover, the 
education sector evidences a consistent desire to decentralize educational policymaking 
authority, especially as it relates to elementary and secondary education.  In all states but 
Hawaii, for example, legislatures have delegated substantial policymaking authority to 
local school districts, governed by local school boards.104  The structural allocation of 
educational policymaking authority itself implies a belief that states and local school 
boards are comparatively better positioned to set desirable education policy and to do so 
in a manner that better reflects local conditions and preferences.105  Finally, key federal 
actors and institutions have long understood that education—particularly elementary and 
secondary education—resides at the core of state and local, not national, responsibility.106 
 
 The Court’s fidelity to local control, however, rests increasingly uneasy in today’s 
education setting.  Stylized notions about local control over America’s school policy, 
however powerful, have not accurately described the allocation of American education 
policy for decades.107  The influence of local school authorities on school policy has 
waned due to legislative assertions by states and the federal government.  Thus, the Court 
displayed increased confidence in local control over school policymaking (including 
fiscal policy) as state and federal lawmakers encroached upon local autonomy.108  Since 
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the 1970s the trend toward greater centralization of education policymaking authority 
has, if anything, accelerated and broadened. 
  
State lawmakers started asserting greater policy control beginning the mid-1980s, 
as states assumed a greater absolute and relative share of local school funding 
responsibility.  In some states the emergence of increased state control was in response to 
successful (or threatened or even unsuccessful) school finance litigation efforts.  Also, 
governors, increasingly held politically responsible for school reform results, demanded 
greater policy control.  Finally, in response to A Nation At Risk report in 1983109 and the 
explosion of legislative responses the report fueled,110 policymakers in many states began 
the task of reviewing and, in some instances, articulating for the first time goals for 
student education outcomes.  All these factors inevitably led to a greater concentration of 
policy authority at the state level and a concurrent diminution of local control. 
 
 Ironically, state efforts to develop and implement standards and assessment 
regimes better enabled the federal government to enter the education policymaking field 
with greater force which had the practical effect of further blurring federalism lines and 
diluting local control.111  Federal involvement with K-12 education policy increased in 
dramatic fashion with the No Child Left Behind Act 2001112 (“NCLB”).  At its core, 
NCLB leverages state-created standards and assessments, increases transparency by 
disseminating data on progress, and imposes consequences on local districts and schools 
for insufficient progress. States desiring NCLB funds must establish school 
accountability systems that moor annual student proficiency to math and reading 
assessments for grades three through eight.113  States must also gather, report, and 
disseminate results for all students as well as for various student subgroups that contain a 
minimum number of students.114  Although state standards must be “challenging,”115 
NCLB essentially leaves it to the states to establish their own standards and assessments, 
as well as proficiency thresholds.116  A sliding scale of consequences befalls schools that 
do not achieve adequate yearly progress.117  In exchange for federal education dollars, 
districts and states must now submit to increasingly onerous federal education laws.  One 
inevitable consequence of school reform initiatives at the state and federal levels (as well 
as increased state and federal education spending) has been a further dilution of local 
control over school policy. 
 
The Court As A “Super Legislature” and Practical Concerns 
 
Embedded within the Rodriguez opinion are logical dilemmas and practical 
concerns.  For example, the Court points to federalism, fear of unintended consequences, 
and practical concerns as reasons for declining the plaintiffs’ invitation to restructure 
much of the nation’s school finance system.  According to the Court, “consideration and 
initiation of fundamental [school finance] reforms” are issues properly “reserved for the 
legislative processes of the various States.”118  More specifically, proposed solutions to 
school finance problems “must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic 
pressures of those who elect them.”119  By deferring to Texas lawmakers, the Court 
noted, “we [the Court] do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of 
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powers by staying our hand.”120  The Court left unanswered, however, whether striking 
down the Texas law would also violate federalism principles.121 
 
The Court noted its concerns about the possible consequences (unintended or 
intentional) and the potential political backlash that striking down Texas’ school finance 
system might unleash.  The concerns range from political resistance to calls for 
significant increases in education spending122 to exacerbating spending gaps between 
urban and suburban districts.123  Some—but not all—of the Court’s concerns were well-
founded.  The decades of judicial engagement with school finance reform since 
Rodriguez reveal that the Court’s prediction about political resistance to calls for 
significant spending increases proved far more prescient than the Court’s prediction 
about exacerbating gaps between urban and suburban districts. 
 
 Practical concerns also informed the Court’s analysis in Rodriguez.  At the 
institutional level, the opinion conveys a presumption of judicial incompetence, at least 
when it comes to the practical nuances of school finance.  The opinion notes that “the 
Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and familiarity with local problems 
necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of 
public revenues.”124 
 
 Finally, the majority opinion in Rodriguez breaks with tradition by closing with a 
“cautionary postscript”125 that develops two general practical points.  First, the Court 
characterizes Rodriguez’s request as one that would involve billions of new tax dollars,126 
“massive change,” and “completely uprooting the existing (education) system.”127  
Although noting that such predictions about the future consequences of upholding the 
district court ruling were little more than mere guesses, the Court clearly conveyed its 
unwillingness to risk such consequences.  Having noted such “practical considerations,” 
in an almost self-conscious gesture, the Court went on to explain that such 
considerations, “of course, play no role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues 
presented here.”128 
 
 Second, even though the Court concluded that Texas’ school finance system 
passed constitutional muster, the Court also made clear its view that school finance 
reform was needed.129  The Rodriguez opinion specifically encouraged further attention 
from scholars.130  Despite suggesting that change was necessary, the Court’s opinion 
closed on its most salient theme.  That is, despite the necessity of reform, the Rodriguez 
opinion returned to a central theme that, as a matter of constitutional law, reform must 
flow from the legislature or executive rather than the judiciary.131 
 
The Influence of Student Research 
 
 The Rodriguez lawsuit underscored student research’s potential to influence 
litigation and judicial opinions.  In 1965—three years before the Rodriguez complaint 
was filed—while pursuing a Ph.D. at the University of Chicago, Arthur Wise published 
an article that contemplated federal Equal Protection Clause dimensions flowing from per 
pupil funding disparities.132  Wise’s full argument emerged two years later in his 
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dissertation,133 which elicited a published response from one of his professors,134 and 
culminated in the 1968 publication of his influential book, Rich Schools, Poor Schools: 
The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity.135 
 
Elements of the Rodriguez complaint reveal the influence of Art Wise’s work 
conducted while he was in graduate school.  As early as 1965, Wise identified poverty’s 
potential Fourteenth Amendment salience and argued that, from the perspective of school 
finance litigation, the criminal and education contexts were similar.136  The potential 
federal constitutional implications posed by intrastate variations in per pupil spending, 
such as what existed in Texas when Rodriguez was filed, were novel and a distinct break 
from Serrano’s focus on the California constitution.  By arguing that poverty constituted 
a suspect classification and triggered strict judicial scrutiny in the school setting, Wise 
articulated one of the Rodriguez lawsuit’s two fundamental analytic pillars.137 
 
 Although graduate student work informed the structure of the Rodriguez lawsuit, 
law student research informed the Rodriguez opinion.138  One of the plaintiffs’ central 
arguments was that low-income families clustered in the poorest property school districts 
and that Texas’ school finance system discriminated against low-income students.  That 
per pupil spending in the less affluent Edgewood schools was less than that in the more 
affluent Alamo Heights district evidenced the discrimination.  The argument—critical to 
Rodriguez’s case—necessarily assumed a relation between low-income households and 
low per pupil spending school districts, an assumption the district court accepted.139 
 
A law student undertook a clever study which assessed whether poor families in 
fact clustered in the poorest property districts.  The study analyzed data from the 130 
largest towns in Connecticut, which accounted for 95 percent of the state population and 
96 percent of the state’s total property values.  Although the author analyzed three 
separate—though related—premises critical to school finance litigation, the Court’s 
Rodriguez opinion focused on the first premise: that individual wealth corresponded with 
[school] district wealth. 
 
The law student considered three different ways to assess individual family 
wealth and six alternatives for school district wealth.  Partial correlations analysis140 of 
the various combinations of family and school district wealth revealed several interesting 
outcomes.  First, when poverty was construed to mean “percent of population living 
below the poverty line,” no statistically significant correlation existed between families in 
poverty and total per pupil spending.141  Second, when district wealth was construed 
more narrowly and only in terms of residential property value, a statistically significant 
relation emerged between district wealth and family poverty.142  Third, ironically, when 
district wealth was defined in terms of business wealth, a positive correlation emerged 
with family poverty.  That is, poor families tended to cluster in wealthier areas, where 
wealth was construed in terms of commercial and industrial property value.143  The 
authors noted that, at best, the statistical relation between families living in poverty and 
school district wealth was unclear.  In terms of business and industrial wealth, however, 
low-income families were more likely to live in wealthier districts.   Thus, the author 
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concluded that “the popular belief that the ‘poor’ live in ‘poor’ [school] districts is clearly 
mistaken.”144 
 
 Although the study’s methodology might be viewed as somewhat crude by 
today’s standards, it was not at the time the work was published (1972).  In terms of its 
probative value to the Rodriguez case, however, the study possessed important 
limitations.  First, the study used cross-sectional (1970) data from one state 
(Connecticut).  Whether findings from Connecticut could properly be generalized to 
Texas (or any other state) remained unclear.  Indeed, the Court wondered whether the 
statistical findings in Connecticut “would be discovered in Texas.”145 
 
What to do with such uncertainty, however, was a separate question.  General 
scholarly norms, especially in the empirical social sciences, place the burden of such 
uncertainty on the shoulders of those seeking to expand the scope of research findings.  
Thus, professional prudence would counsel against social scientists drawing inferences 
for Texas from Connecticut’s findings absent persuasive evidence that the two states 
were similar in salient respects.  The Court (composed of jurists rather than formally 
trained social scientists), however, drew just such an inference.  More specifically, 
because the plaintiffs in Rodriguez did not factually establish that poor families cluster in 
poor spending school districts in Texas, the Court implicitly assumed that the findings 
from the Connecticut study (finding no such clustering) were informative and, thus, 
rejected an assumption critical to the plaintiff’s case in Rodriguez.146  In so doing, the 
Court effectively flipped the traditional social scientific burden placement. 
 
Rodriguez’s Aftermath in San Antonio and Elsewhere 
 
 To be sure, Demetrio Rodriguez (and others in the plaintiff class) lost in the 
United States Supreme Court.  The loss all but foreclosed a single, national judicial 
solution to a persistent school finance dilemma.  And losses in court, even 5-4 losses such 
as Rodriguez, resist sugar-coating efforts.  Unlike many litigation losses, the outcome in 
Rodriguez was the end of one story and the beginning of many others, including 
protracted state court litigation and political squabbles in Texas.147  In 1991, reflecting on 
decades of school finance litigation and reform, then-Dean Mark Yudof predicted a “long 
and tedious” tussle between Texas courts and lawmakers and further observed that: “The 
story is beginning to resemble War and Peace, though it is likely to be less amusing. One 
can only hope that its conclusion will be less catastrophic.”148  Although it is abundantly 
clear that the story in Texas is already long, it is far from clear whether anything 
resembling a conclusion is in sight more than three decades since the Rodriguez decision. 
 
Edgewood v. Kirby 
 
Just over one decade following the Rodriguez decision, another lawsuit was filed, 
this time in Texas state court.  Unlike the initial lawsuit, in the state litigation the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) took the litigation 
lead and argued that Texas’ school finance system violated the state’s equal protection149 
and education clauses.150  In 1989 the Texas Supreme Court sided with the school district 
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and ordered state lawmakers to fix its school finance system in time for the 1990-91 
school year.151  The 1989 decision unleashed a series of legislative efforts and successive 
litigation, culminating in Texas Senate Bill 7.152  Passed in 1993, Senate Bill 7 had the 
effect of reducing per pupil spending disparities by redistributing funds generated in 
wealthy districts to their less wealthy counterparts.153  A hold-harmless provision 
provides wealthy districts with some redistributive relief.  Notwithstanding Senate Bill 7, 
funding disparities persisted and fueled subsequent litigation.  Incident to litigation, the 
Texas Supreme Court concluded in 1995 (however reluctantly) that Texas’ Senate Bill 7 
passed constitutional muster.154 
 
Neeley v. West-Orange Cove Consolidated Schools 
 
School finance controversy in Texas did not end in 1995, however, with the final 
Edgewood litigation and the passage of Senate Bill 7.  Senate Bill 7, which re-structured 
school finance, did so in a manner that created a state property tax, which is prohibited by 
the Texas Constitution.155  Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court noted as much and warned 
that Senate Bill 7, if ignored over time, would likely create additional legal problems 
sometime in the future.  That future arrived in 2001 when Texas school districts initiated 
yet another round of litigation challenging the Texas school finance system for precisely 
the reasons the court warned of years earlier.156 
 
The Texas courts’ most recent activity will likely ensure even more litigation in 
the future, but, perhaps, on slightly narrower grounds.  As expected, the Texas court 
concluded that the state’s control over local taxation for education amounted to a de facto 
state property tax that violated the Texas Constitution.157  The 2005 court decision 
requires Texas lawmakers, once again, to take up the issue of school finance.158  If history 
is any guide, further litigation will arise regardless of what Texas lawmakers do. 
 
The subsequent litigation, which will assuredly follow, will likely be somewhat 
more focused owing to the court’s conclusion that Texas school finance system’s 
deficiencies—including, notably, the substantial unequal access to education revenue—
do not render the school finance system constitutionally inadequate or inefficient.159  
Given its historic prominence in the Texas school finance battles, it is not surprising that 
the Edgewood District, once again, led the charge on the inequitable claim.160  What is 
particularly ominous to Edgewood’s prospects for litigation success in the future, 
however, was the Texas Supreme Court’s finding that: “While the end-product of public 
education is related to the resources available for its use,… more money does not 
guarantee better schools or more educated students.”161  Whether the Texas high court’s 
recent decision in Neeley signals the Court’s desire to wind down judicial engagement or, 
rather, merely a narrowing of the terrain in which the Court will engage remains to be 
seen. 
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The Twenty-First Century and an Emerging National Trend Toward Increased 
Judicial Reluctance 
 
 The recent developments in Texas’ multi-decade school finance litigation saga, 
ignited decades ago by Demetrio Rodriguez, are consistent with a potential nation-wide 
trend toward increased judicial modesty in the school finance setting.  Specifically, courts 
have pulled back a bit in a few states where lawmakers and executives acted incident to 
litigation.162  Even where legislatures and executives acted in ways designed to address 
school finance challenges, follow-up litigation frequently ensues and asserts that 
constitutional violations persist.  This follow-up litigation invites the judicial branch not 
only to re-engage with school finance policy but also to assume even broader and deeper 
roles in re-shaping school finance systems. 
 
It is at this precise point where school finance litigation enters a critical stage.  On 
the one hand, such litigation can follow the “New Jersey” path and risk a multi-decade 
struggle among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches over the school finance 
turf.163  On the other hand, recent experiences in others states differ and hint at a potential 
trend.  During the 1990s state supreme court decisions in Alabama, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts were cited by school finance reform activists as evidence of a litigation 
strategy’s efficaciousness.   Subsequent decisions in all three states, however, suggest 
something of a judicial retreat.  In 1993, an Alabama court boldly announced that the 
state was obligated to provide an adequate education to its citizens.164   The court order 
was especially particular in what it meant by an adequate education.165   More recently, 
however, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed further proceedings, pointing to 
separation of powers concerns.166   Likewise, after protracted litigation in Ohio, in 2003 
the Ohio Supreme Court terminated a trial court’s jurisdiction over a school finance case 
and effectively brought to a close multi-decade litigation in Ohio.167 
 
A similar court response emerged in Massachusetts.  In 1993, Massachusetts’ 
Supreme Judicial Court ruled in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of 
Education168 that the state failed to fulfill its state constitutional obligation and noted in 
particular the deleterious consequences of the state’s overwhelming reliance on local 
property tax revenues.   Three days after the McDuffy opinion was announced 
Massachusetts lawmakers passed the Education Reform Act of 1993.169   The Act 
radically restructured education in Massachusetts, especially as it related to school 
funding, student goals and performance, and school and school district accountability 
provisions.  After another round of school finance litigation challenging the state’s 
Education Reform Act, the Massachusetts high court concluded that the state had taken 
reasonable and appropriate steps in a timely manner to address school funding and 
student achievement disparities.170   The decision brought to a close twenty-seven years 
of litigation and twelve years of state court supervision over school finance matters in 
Massachusetts.171 
 
Conclusion: Assessing Rodriquez’s Legacy 
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Demetrio Rodriguez noted as recently as 2005 that the school finance fight he 
helped launch in 1968 is one that “you never get finished with.”172  From Demetrio’s 
perspective, while the struggle has yielded some progress, “the state doesn’t really want 
to give every child in Texas a fair share of the state’s wealth.”173  Although emerging 
school finance litigation trends contribute to a broader understanding of Rodriguez and 
Demetrio’s perspective, Rodriguez’s full legacy is not yet understood, even though 
almost four decades have passed since the Rodriguez complaint was filed in federal 
district court. 
 
On the one hand, the Rodriguez litigation may represent a mis-step that cost the 
Edgewood schools and residents six important years in terms of their quest for greater 
school finance justice.  On the other hand–regardless of the loss at the U.S. Supreme 
Court—Rodriguez might be better understood as a necessary step.  Once school finance 
reform activists learned that the U.S. Constitution would not construe education as a 
fundamental right or poverty as a suspect classification, the school finance movement 
understood precisely where it needed to fight its battles—in state courts and legislatures. 
 
 A responsible account of Rodriguez cannot run away from the decidedly mixed 
school finance litigation movement that Rodriguez both informed and helped inspire.  
Setting aside disputes about the efficacy of successful school finance lawsuits in 
generating sought after increases in educational spending, two large themes endure that 
almost crowd out technical academic debates.  First, despite multiple decades of school 
finance litigation, it remains abundantly clear—indeed, painfully obvious—that far too 
many schools persistently fail their duty to competently educate.  This is true in Texas as 
well as in every other state in the Union.  Worse still, these failures remain hauntingly 
easy to predict.  As Professor Howard Gardner174 notes: 
 
Tell me the zip code of a child and I will predict her chances of college 
completion and probable income; add the elements of family support 
(parental, grandparental, ethnic and religious values) and few degrees of 
freedom remain, at least in our country.175 
 
 The notion that geography is educational destiny for children is precisely what 
Rodriguez endeavored to eradicate.  To be sure, the plaintiffs consigned to the Edgewood 
district zip code lost in Rodriguez.  But more than thirty years of Rodriguez-inspired 
school finance litigation has taken place, and plaintiff victories, while not assured, have 
increased over time.  Despite such victories, however, the empirically demonstrable 
correlations Professor Gardner describes—correlations easily replicated by most second-
year graduate students—persist.  And their persistence drives a stake through the heart of 
what Rodriguez sought to accomplish.  Although reasonable observers may differ on how 
to best understand what equal educational opportunity means in any given context, 
reasonable observers should agree that if equal education means anything, at the very 
least, it must mean that geography should no longer predict a child’s educational future.  
The link between the happenstance of geography and education quality is precisely what 
Rodriguez and the school finance litigation movement it contributed to sought to sever.  
Nevertheless, the link persists.  It remains critical to understand why. 
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 The two zip codes at issue in Rodriguez—78237 and 78209—while close 
numerically remain far apart in terms of education futures.  The former is the zip code for 
Edgewood schools; the latter for Alamo Heights schools.  Although the magnitude of the 
gaps has lessened, differences in educational resources persist.  Edgewood schools spend 
approximately $7,238 per pupil and benefit from a 17:1 student-teacher ratio.176  For 
Alamo Heights schools, the figures are $7,852 and 14:1, respectively.177  Setting aside 
nettlesome and complicated questions about causation, the Edgewood students continue 
to struggle despite decades of litigation.  In 2004, 41 percent of Edgewood’s tenth-
graders and 71 percent of its third-graders passed various statewide standardized math 
and reading tests.178  Even though Edgewood students evidence progress, they still lag 
behind state averages (64 and 86 percent, respectively).  As well, in 2003 Edgewood SAT 
takers averaged a combined score of 791 (out of 1600) compared with the state average 
of 989. 
 
What to make of current data is far from clear.  What is clear, however, is that 
Rodriguez’s legacy remains mixed and it continues to mean different things to different 
people.  Although the school finance reform movement—including its litigation prong—
has long moved beyond the Rodriguez opinion, important challenges remain.  While 
perhaps of little solace to Demetrio Rodriguez and the many children struggling to learn 
in Edgewood’s comparatively under-resourced schools, the Supreme Court’s deference to 
federalism in Rodriguez generated at least one unexpected result.  By effectively closing 
federal courts to the school finance litigants in Rodriguez, the Court redirected the school 
finance reform movement to the nation’s state legislatures, courts, and state constitutional 
text.  In so doing, the school finance experience helped bring to life Justice William 
Brennan's plea for state supreme courts to continue the Warren Court's rights revolution 
under the auspices of state constitutional interpretation.179  Although the results have 
been mixed in the school finance context, school finance litigation serves as a powerful 
reminder to all about limits to the federal Constitution as well as the potential breadth, 
scope, and promise of state constitutions. 
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